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The IMF and  the global economy: implications for developing
countries
Frances Stewart and Valpy FitzGerald*
This paper reviews the functioning of the IMF in relation to its own objectives, as laid down
in the Articles of Agreement, and the needs of developing countries. It finds serious
deficiencies in its functioning as a global financial institution. It typically takes a country-by-
country stand, and has failed to find soultions to global problems, such as the debt problem
of the 1980s, or the need to coordinate national economic policies. The IMF has not been
able to deal satisfactorily with the growth and fluctuations in international financial capital
flows. There have also been serious deficiencies in the IMF treatment of individual
developing countries, with a tendency to be excessively deflationary with harsh consequences
for the poor in developing countries. The paper concludes with nine proposals for reform. An
appendix provides a rough costing of these proposals.
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Introduction
The fundamental objective of the IMF was laid out in the first of its Articles of Agreement
when it was established in 1944: 
to facilitate the expansion of balanced growth in international trade, and to contribute
thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real
income and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary
objectives of economic policy.
This objective still expresses the aspirations most would have for an international monetary
authority. Hence any assessment of Fund performance over the years must consider how far it 
has been fulfilled and what, if any, changes are needed to improve its performance.
The IMF is the major global player in international monetary matters. When it was founded it
was expected that its actions would be directed to developed countries and not developing
countries, who were then, for the most part, only bit players (or still under colonial tutelage).
However, in practice most of its lending (almost all in recent years) has been to developing
countries: for them, but not for developed countries, the Fund has had a major policy-making
role. Hence the performance of the Fund should be assessed at two levels: first, as the one
institution able to take public action with respect to global monetary matters; and secondly, in
terms of  the impact of its activities on the economies of developing countries.
The Fund and the Global Economy 
The success of the post-second world war economy has generally been viewed as a success for
the Bretton Woods system. Competitive devaluation and tariff escalation were avoided;
currency convertibility, tariffs,  other trade restrictions and capital controls were successively
reduced; economic growth was maintained with some blips but no devastating world
recessions, and many developing countries achieved major economic and social progress. 
However, it would be wrong to deduce from this that the IMF has successfully fulfilled the
intentions of its founders, or that today it functions in the way that is needed of a globalQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 3
monetary authority. In the first place, much of the success of the Bretton Woods era was not
due to the Bretton Woods institutions but to other factors; and secondly,  the IMF has made
serious errors of commission and omission, with respect to the functioning of the world
economy generally, and developing countries in particular. For developing countries, it has
enforced financial discipline but at a high cost in terms of loss in output growth and increased
poverty. 
The IMF in fact had little to do with the sustained world economic recovery and growth from
1945 to 1980.  Major factors responsible included the  Marshall and Dodge Plans -  which
permitted Europe and Japan to combine economic expansion with moves towards trade and
currency convertibility; negotiations for freer trade conducted by GATT; the institution of the
European Community which contributed to recovery and growth in Europe; the success of
many of the newly independent developing countries in raising savings and investment,
extending education and health services and generally providing the necessary conditions for
agricultural and industrial development. The IMF contributed little to these efforts.
Despite being the one global player on the scene, the IMF has rarely taken a global view,
rather examining countries one-by-one, and not adding up the consequences for the world
economy of its advice to individual countries. There are many instances when the failure to
take a global view has permitted deterioration in the world economy, while the advice given to
individual countries has compounded rather than alleviated the initial situation. For example:
- the massive recycling of petrodollars during the 1970s took place largely through the
commercial banking system: the IMF did not play a central role in this recycling process. The
IMF (and the World Bank) did manage to channel some funds towards the poorer countries
seriously affected by the new oil price regime, and although this had considerable  welfare
benefits, it did not significantly affect world financial markets. More seriously, neither the
Fund nor the BIS (nor the respective national authorities) appear to have attempted to
exercise ex ante control over the larger borrowing governments nor, as importantly, over the
lending banks to prevent the accumulation of bad debt. 
- in the world recession of the early 1980s, the fund made no global proposals  for coordinated
reflation, nor did it issue additional liquidity in the form of SDRs to support reflation, whileQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 4
the many countries seeking funds and policy-advice from the Fund were told to cut 
expenditure, thus adding to world recession; 
- as commodity prices fell to unprecedented levels in the 1980s, the Fund made no suggestions
for world action (e.g. by coordinated taxes on commodities,or production cutbacks and
quotas), but told individual producing countries in foreign exchange difficulties to improve the
incentives for the production of commodities, irrespective of the world price elasticities of
these commodities. The result was to increase commodity production, reduce commodity
prices further, and in some cases (e.g. cocoa) to reduce the net foreign exchange earnings of
countries which succeeded in expanding production.
- during the debt crisis of the 1980s, the Fund put forward no proposals for systemic reform,
but insisted that individual debtors pay their debts in full, which required harsh cutbacks in
output and consumption, and still did not eliminate the problem. The debt situation turned
round not because of the actions of the Fund but because of imaginative proposals and action
by Brady, the Treasury Secretary in the US.
- in the late 1980s, the process of privatization and financial liberalization attracted a new type
of foreign investor - institutional fund managers - to ‘emerging markets’. These new capital
flows of the 1990s were not regulated by the IMF either, which was unable to overcome the
asymmetric information and agency problems which inevitably arose and culminated in another
Mexican collapse in 1994-5. Once again, the US Treasury was forced to intervene in order to
bail out US investors; a key element of the rescue operation being the largest loan in IMF
history - which was arranged in record time without rigorous conditionality. The Fund
continues to advocate deregulation to individual countries, despite the potential havoc this
may cause, and has made no proposals for international regulation.
- just as a number of OECD countries were expressing doubt as to the value of IMF to
international economic management, the end of the Cold War in 1989 gave a new role to the
Fund as the administrator of the radical liberalization of the Eastern European economies - a
role it could take on because it was the only institution with the staff and a well defined
economic model to undertake the task after its experience in Latin America. However, the
relative success of this transitional role in Eastern Europe (which has now been replaced byQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 5
the longer-term tasks of industrial modernization) had little to do with the regulation of global
capital markets.
The role of the Fund in the 1990s
With the Cold War at an end, the debt crisis apparently resolved and widespread agreement on
economic policy, it seemed at the close of the 1980s that the developing countries would be
the main beneficiaries of a dynamic world economy. The extension of free trade throughout
the world and the integration of capital markets implied a truly ’global economy’  where poor
countries with sound economic policies could now expect rapid export growth and massive
foreign investment inflows to support efficient production structures and economic growth, 
and to eliminate poverty. However, during the 1990s this optimism has been rapidly eroded as
the chronic instability in global financial markets has revealed both the limitations of
international regulatory institutions and the risks to developing countries of rapid integration
to global markets.  
The role of the IMF under these circumstances is to provide - along with other “global”
institutions such as the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) and the OECD - apppropriate institutional support for an orderly global capital market
that can promote trade and investment finance worldwide in line with its Articles of
Agreement.
Continued instability in foreign exchange markets - particularly the strains within the EMS and
the decline of the dollar during the 1990s - has led to renewed interest in the possible role of
the IMF in preventing and managing crises in international financial markets.  As the capacity
(and willingness) of the US authorities to continue as the world's central banker has declined,
and the German and Japanese authorities have apparently been unable to share the burden
effectively, this is perhaps not surprising. Indeed, the Bretton Woods Commission is quite
clear that the degree of volatility under floating exchange rates since 1971 has been associated
with lower growth rates, and strongly recommends a return to an administered (ie flexible)
fixed-rate system coordinated by the IMF in representation of the G7.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 6
  World Bank, 1995,  Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries (Washington
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None the less, the standard paradigm for the structural adjustment of developing economies
still identifies the world market as an efficient allocator of global resources. Openness as a
development strategy  "constitutes perhaps the most important opportunity for raising the
welfare of both developing and industrial countries in the long term..." (World Bank, 1995,
v).   However, despite this optimism about global integration,  it is widely agreed that in
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practice international financial instability has slowed growth in the industrial economies, 
excluded developing countries from global capital markets and led to switchback style
economic fortunes for some developing countries which are intergated into the world system,
notably, in recent years, Mexico. 
Developing countries rely on capital flows to sustain investment and suffer disproportionately
from international financial volatility in a number of ways, among which the most important
are:
i) exchange rate instability, high interest rates and low investment slow down
growth in OECD countries, and thus export demand from the rest of the world;
ii) high interest rates raise the cost of debt service and cause fiscal strain in LDCs,
causing macroeconomic instability and reducing private investment;
iii) global market uncertainty excludes many developing countries from access to
private capital flows, and subjects others to destabilizing volatility in flows;
iv) the inability of capital markets to work out debt burdens in response to
insolvency imposes a long-term resource burden on poorer countries and
further reduces their attractiveness to foreign investors;
v) the more vulnerable LDCs become subject to policy conditionality that goes
beyond ensuring that international obligations are met and raises questions of
sovereignty. 
The concern of the founding fathers of the IMF at Bretton Woods as to the consequences of
volatile capital flows were not only conditioned by the immediate post-War circumstances but
also by their fear of the consequences of a return to unfettered private capital movements
which had caused such instability in the inter-War period.  Keynes’ perception of uncertaintyQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 7
as a driving force in market sentiment, and the consequent need for institutional structures to
reduce uncertainty and promote productive investment, seems more relevant than ever.
In sum, the tasks required of a global financial regulator today have two dimensions that also
characterize central banking in a closed economy: (a) the provision of liquidity as ‘lender of
last resort’ to smooth temporary fluctuations in market sentiment; and (b) the establishment of
an orderly financial market by prudential regulation of the financial intermediaries themselves. 
Global lender-of the-last resort
The Fund is the most plausible candidate for this role of providing ’backstop finance’ on a
regular basis. The G7 central banks (and those of the G3 in particular) have of course been
responsible for the major rescue operations in post-War history, but they lack any institutional
apparatus. While for the European Union the existing coordination mechanism based on the
Bundesbank should evolve into the European Monetary Institute by the end of the century,
this will not be extended to global coverage. The Bank of International Settlements has only
provided bridging finance in the past, and does not have any developing country participation
or operating experience in stabilization programmes.
Although the IMF was originally conceived as a potential lender of last resort, this was
foreseen as a "current account" problem, and Article VI specifically precluded lending to
finance a capital outflow - which the same article implied should be handled by administrative
controls. However, in practice Article VI is not applied and the Fund now argues against
capital controls (although it does appear to support various sterilization measures) so that
logically this preclusion should not prove a real obstacle.
The coverage of any such  scheme would presumably be limited to non-industrial countries,
and would depend on whether fixed exchange rates are felt to be a desirable policy. On the
assumption that flexible parities remain the rule,  then such intervention would mainly be
justified in cases of indebted countries at the margin of the private capital market. Moreover,
even this category could be reduced by arguing that last-resort lending should be restricted to
cases where default would pose a systemic threat, spilling over into a withdrawal of fundsQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 8
  See M. Camdessus, "Short-Term Financing Facility" paper presented to the IMF Executive
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Board, 26 September 1994.
from neighbouring or similar countries.
The proposal by the IMF to create a new short term financing facility (STFF)  which could be
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disbursed very rapidly to counter swings in market sentiment and speculative pressures which
do not reflect economic fundamentals represents a move towards fulfilling the lender-of-the-
last resort role. It would complement the Fund’s existing facilities for countering perverse
capital movements, particularly in two difficult situations involving critical discontinuities
where support must be immediate if it is to be effective at all: (a) the defence of an exchange
rate peg; and (b) illiquidity causing default risk. Coverage under the proposal would be limited
to some fifty (mainly upper middle-income countries) which have a high degree of involvement
in the international capital market. The terms of access would be based on specific ’drawing
right’ provisions made under the regular Article IV consultation, in cases where the Fund
determined that country has a sound policy record and no fundamental balance of payments
problem. This could be made automatic and thus very rapid, but only at some risk to the Fund
- particularly if it ended up effectively funding (and thus enabling) capital flight. The level of
access (which could be arranged in tranches) would need to be commensurate with potential
reserve losses - although without fully financing capital flight but rather relying on positive
signalling effects on markets - and could reach 300% of quota. However, the maturity of the
loans would be short (three months) and if the problem persisted it could be replaced by a
normal standby or extended arrangement. 
Ideally, the source of the funds required for this purpose should be provided by new sources
of liquidity - at best the issue of SDRs or at least the expenditure of the excess reserves of
surplus economies such as Japan - as proposed by the IMF Managing Director at the
Copenhagen Social Summit in March 1995. The proposal to use SDRs for this purpose has its
roots in the Keynes Plan at the original Bretton Woods conference, which included the
automatic use of reserves of surplus countries for operations by the Fund. It would involve
modification of Article XVIII which requires SDRs to be allocated pro rata to existing quotas
( a restriction which is already under strain due to the current G7 proposal to allocation theQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 9
first SDR increase since 1981 to the transition economies).
If the conversion of SDRs into a true fiduciary reserve asset is not acceptable to the more
conservative members of the G7, the STFF could be financed by the IMF borrowing on
financial markets, effectively creating liquidity by converting long-term liabilities into short-
term assets. As in the case of the World Bank, the willingness to subscribe would not arise
from the quality of IMF assets (ie the STFF loans) but rather their underwriting by the G3.
Assuming that this would be forthcoming, the relevant criterion becomes the likely
effectiveness of such a scheme. On the one hand, like all last-resort lending, it could delay
adjustment rather than make it easier and thus requires fine judgement as to future government
behaviour - even though the ’moral hazard’ dilemma would clearly apply more to the creditors
than to the debtors in such circumstances. On the other, the speed of intervention is crucial in
such cases, and thus automatic access on country request (or at most on approval by Fund
executives) would be necessary - which would effectively disenfranchise the Executive Board. 
Thus the quality of the Fund’s assessment is crucial in determining whether the effects will be
positive and in giving the right signals to international capital markets - particularly where by
definition it is necessary to intervene against prevailing market sentiment. 
The scale of intervention in three recent crises gives some idea of the funding problem
involved in global central banking were countries of any size to be involved. In one day in
early June 1995, the G3 central banks spent $20 billion in supporting the dollar - an effect
which lasted for little more than a week. During the 1992 ERM crisis, some $130bn was
mobilised (mainly by the Bundesbank) in defence of the currencies of Denmark, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, Spain and the UK - countries whose combined IMF quotas were $23 billion, and
thus under the proposed 300% rule could have drawn only $70 billion. In the Mexican crisis,
$50 billion was eventually needed for the rescue plan.
At first sight, the recent Mexican crisis appears to be a good example of the potential use of
such a STFF: in fact the initial IMF access offered to Mexico of $7.8 billion was three times
quota, but this was rapidly raised to $ 17.8 billion (ie seven times quota). Even though this
was only a third of the $50 billion required for the rescue plan, it was widely regarded at the
time as an impressive display of flexibility by the Fund faced by the threat of a systemic threatQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 10
  IMF, 1995,  World Economic Outlook  Washington DC: International Monetary Fund
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to world capital markets (or at least emerging markets). However, in retrospect the episode
can be seen as evidence of the continued power of the US Treasury to change the unwritten
rules in support of US investors, while the nature of the operation (refinancing Mexican
treasury bills) was such that medium-term rather than short-term resources were clearly
needed.   In this context, the Mexican experience does not seem to be a promising example of
Fund management as it did not warn either side adequately before the event - although neither
did the leading private sector ratings agencies. Even after the event the Fund could not decide
on the origins of the problem, offering three alternative explanations for the excessive current
account deficit generated by the private sector which it had not previously thought significant.
3
There are a number of potential externalities arising from effective large-scale intervention in
support of capital markets. First, the potential ’crowding in’ of foreign investment as a
consequence of increased confidence arising from an IMF support operation might be
accompanied by a ’crowding out’ of other lending activities of the Fund. Clearly this is much
more likely if it were financed from the Fund’s regular resources (or gold sales) than if special
arrangements were made for a special issue of SDRs or to borrow from another source such
as the General Agreement to Borrow (GAB) or directly from the market. Second, there would
be a general gain if the creation of the new facility reinvigorated the Fund as part of a stronger
system of global economic management - particularly if this involved the active participation
of industrial economies and greater coordination of their macroeconomic (and thus exchange
rate) policies. Cooperative handling of problems of debt overhang, transition to market
systems and access to capital markets would benefit not only the country directly involved but
also other LDCs in similar situations - both through a learning process and enhanced investor
confidence. Third, if the financing of the STFF involves the provision of liquidity rather than
insistence on recessionary stabilization programmes this should help to sustain steady global
demand growth. 
Global financial regulationQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 11
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A logical complement to discretionary intervention in order to compensate for market failure
ex post is the reorganization of markets themselves in order to reduce the likelihood of such
failure ex ante. Indeed, the effectiveness of international public institutions - which range from
securities market regulators to the Bretton Woods bodies themselves - should be judged in
terms of their ability to maintain an orderly market and stimulate real investment, growth and
employment on a global scale. 
The rapid development of international financial markets in recent years has had a paradoxical
consequence. On the one hand, the increased marketability of assets has lead to increased
liquidity - thus decreasing the need for access to official borrowing in the case of most middle-
income countries and many of the larger low-income countries such as India and China.  On
the other hand, this liquidity has increased systemic risk because collapse or insolvency can be
rapidly transmitted from one market or institution to another. Indeed it has been apparent for
some time that this problem is particularly acute where regulatory systems have incomplete
coverage or overlap in an inconsistent manner, creating opportunities for speculative profits:
"there is a growing tendency to build financial links along regulatory fault lines where the
responsibility for supervisory oversight is weak, divided or clouded".
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From the point of view of non-industrial countries, there are particular problems arising from
this process: (a) the need for greater investor protection and incentives in order to encourage
longer term investment; (b) the threat of contagion from default in the region spreading to
other neighbours; and (c) the additional macroeconomic instability caused by fluctuations in
narrow and shallow domestic security markets which attract foreign capital inflows.
The maintenance of stable access to international capital markets is crucial - particularly under
conditions of exogenous shocks - so as to permit high levels of investment leading to
sustainable growth of output, productivity and employment.  Global central banking thus
requires a combination of crisis intervention and prudential regulation - not just the provision
of liquidity as lender of last resort. Given that liquidity in a complex global capital market is
more a matter of asset preference than one of money supply as such effective interventionQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 12
requies adequate  regulation and conversely. 
To date, the global regulatory functions have been undertaken by the BIS, a pre-Bretton
Woods institution, having been founded in 1930 as a means of payments crisis prevention -
which coordinates the increasingly autonomous OECD central banks and focuses on
maintaining payments systems rather than provision of liquidity. Such prudential regulation is
becoming more important as international capital flows shift from public to private sectors.
The object of the BIS in practice is to curb excessive risk taking by lenders ex ante (instead of
helping borrowers ex post as the Fund does) through regulations as to the asset portfolios of
financial intermediaries. Although it does act as a coordinator of leading central banks in crisis
situations (eg the 1995 Mexican crisis) it does not make loans itself except in the form of
bridging finance.
At present the Basle rules on capital adequacy refer only to banks although the BIS sees a
clear need to extend them to securities firms, to define clearly the jurisdictions of national
regulators and to define the role of internal risk management systems. This is a particular
problem because deposit insurance and lender-of-last-resort facilities are normally only
available to banks, so that other intermediaries are more liable to collapse. In contrast, the
European Commission’s Capital Adequacy Directive of 1993 applies to both credit institutions
and securities firms, and takes certain unsettled obligations explicitly into account. There is
also a marked trend towards allowing supervisory recognition of an institution’s internal
market risk management model, in order to cope with derivative trading and complex
portfolios - which the traditional capital adequacy rules (based on the nature of the
counterparty and the credit risk involved on individual asset classes) cannot do.
Given the similarity in the concerns and functions of the duty of oversight of payment and
settlement systems on the one hand, and those of prudential regulation and supervision on the
other, it is not surprising that both functions are usually performed by central banks in the
domestic context, either directly or indirectly through a financial superintendency. Historically,
both functions have their origin in the role of central bank as an ultimate supplier of a risk-free
medium to the financial system: the provision of liquidity is the last line of defence in the
containment of systemic crises. As the BIS puts it: QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 13
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" Distinguishing solvency from mere liquidity problems is a difficult task; it becomes
practically impossible without the necessary advance knowledge of the financial
condition of participants .... the information needs of the central bank are an important
dimension of the problem of the organisation of the lines of defence to deal with
systemic risk ... (as) ... the progressive expansion in the sphere of markets and hence in
trading can be expected to further heighten the risks involved in the execution of
financial transactions or by the intermediaries facilitating their completion."
5
The integration of financial supervision systems within the US and within the European Union,
both currently under way,  may provide a model for eventual global arrangements.
Unfortunately the other line of advance, that of international coordination between domestic
security regulators (through the International Organization of Securities Commissions) has
made little progress in establishing a parallel for securities firms to want the Basle accord has
done for banking - mainly because of disagreement between the US and other fifty member
countries. In contrast, considerable progress has been made by OECD countries towards the
integration of regulations on direct foreign investment, although this is unlikely to be extended
under the WTO umbrella because of the unwillingness of developing countries to liberalize as
quickly as industrialized ones. 
The non-industrial countries probably have more to gain from a rule-based system than from a
discretionary one, because although the latter allows their special circumstances to be
recognized in a crisis, the former would recognize them as partners in a global system.
Establishing global rules is difficult, as the experience of the Uruguay Round indicates, and
there may appear to be some operational benefit from establishing systems in particular
regions or groups of countries; but in the case of capital markets, an incomplete system is an
invitation to speculation and evasion unless the cost of exclusion is a real deterrent. 
The Bretton Woods Commission felt that "the time is now ripe to restore the original focus of
the Fund on international monetary issues" and strongly recommended that "the IMF should
be given a central role in coordinating macroeconomic policies and in developing andQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 14
   Bretton Woods Commission, 1994, Bretton Woods: looking to the future  A-4,5 (Washington
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implementing monetary reforms", but believed that this would require two previous steps:
"first, the major industrial countries should strengthen their fiscal and monetary policies and
achieve greater overall macroeconomic convergence; and second, these countries should
establish a more formal system of coordination, involving form and credible commitments, to
support these policy improvements and avoid excessive exchange rate misalignments and
volatility".
6
The Mexican crisis of 1994, however, was an indication that the IMF is not currrently taking a
lead role in global financial coordination as noted earlier.  The underwriting of the refinancing
of Mexico’s short-term debt in early 1995 required unprecedented coordination between the
US Treasury, the International Monetary Fund and the Bank of International Settlements, and
thus presented a very good example of the operational problems raised by international crisis
management. But at the Toronto G7 meeting, despite formal agreement on the support
package, strong resentment remained among other members who did not feel that adequate
prior consultation had taken place on an operation to acquire one-third of Mexican debt, while
the absence of adequate and timely information on international asset risk and the inability (or
unwillingness) of markets to handle long-term debt problems seems to have been at the heart
of the Mexican problem - which the IMF neither foresaw nor prevented. This is not a problem
confined to emerging markets subject to unforeseeable political and economic shocks: the debt
problem in a number of smaller OECD economies will probably require coordinated
international action in coming years in order to prevent financial market instability from
bringing the current global economic recovery to a halt.  
Setting up a structure of surveillance and early warning in order to monitor and respond to
emerging crises is essential. However, it is not entirely clear that  the IMF is the best
institution to do this; the Fund would require considerable enhancement of its powers, which
are essentially confined to making funding conditional on the fiscal and monetary policy stance
of a borrowing government. The Fund cannot conduct the kind of open-market operations or
impose the temporary administrative regulation of capital flows required in internationalQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 15
         See S. Dell,  1981, ’On being grandmotherly: the evolution of IMF conditionality’, Princeton Essays
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emergencies - powers which are normally conferred on central banks in order to cope with
financial crises at the national level. Nor can it conduct prudential regulation of lending
institutions to prevent losses on unsafe asset portfolios leading to systemic risks. Without such
powers, or close cooperation with those national or international institutions which might have
(or obtain) these powers, it is very difficult to see how the International Monetary Fund can
fulfil the task with which it was entrusted at Bretton Woods - above all by regulating lenders
as well as borrowers, as national financial authorities do as a matter of course. 
From most perspectives, it must be concluded that the Fund has failed as a global institution
overseeing global economic policy. Two exceptions to this should be noted. One was with the
issue of SDRs in the 1970s, when the Fund did take a global perspective and global action
over world liquidity. But this was not repeated even when it seemed particularly needed in the
1980s. The second is that the Fund has helped impart a philosophy of financial discipline to the
world economy, reflecting its own essentially monetarist philosophy. Yet there has not been
any massive turnaround; inflation, on average, has actually increased in Africa and even  in
Latin America (largely due to the very high inflation rate in Brazil);  fiscal  imbalances remain
as large as ever in Africa, though they have been eliminated in Latin America; the current
account deficit was as large in Latin America in 1992 as it was in 1982; it had been reduced,
mainly as a consequence of lack of finance, in Africa. 
The IMF and individual countries
In practice, given its neglect of global functions, the IMF’s impact has been almost exclusively
through its dealings with individual countries, for whom it provides balance of payments
support. Initially, this was provided mainly to developed countries, according to need and
without policy conditionality.   For example, in 1946, the Managing Director  of the Fund
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stated that the fund could be considered as " sort of automatic machine selling foreign
exchange to members within certain limits."’ However, in 1952 policy conditionality was
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introduced, in response to US pressure, and this has been progressively tightened over the
years. From the 1960s developing countries began to be important clients of the Fund,
although lending continued to developed countries until the late 1970s.  Since then, IMF
lending has been confined to developing and transition countries. The policy conditionality of
the Fund has grown in influence over the decades as the number of countries involved has
risen (typically under ten in any year in the 1950s; up to 25 in the 1960s and 1970s; up to 46 in
the 1980s; rising to 53 in 1992), and as the period of time for which individual countries had
arrangements with the Fund increased - for example in SubSaharan Africa thirteen countries
had Fund programmes for five or more years in the 1980s. 
Fund lending to individual countries raises three types of question: (i)the legitimacy and mode
of agreement of the conditions; (ii) the content and impact of the policy conditions; (iii) the
adequacy and terms of the financial flows.
(i) Legitimacy and mode of agreement of Fund conditionality. Any institution (e.g. a
commercial bank) which is lending and expects repayment is entitled to some sort of guarantee
that repayment will occur. Since countries cannot (or at least do not) present collateral, policy
conditionality substitutes for this to provide the assurance that policy changes will be
undertaken which generate the resources necessary for repayment. From this perspective,
policy conditionality is perfectly legitimate. But there are many alternative policy packages
which would offer the promise of generating enough foreign exchange to guarantee
repayment. The Fund, however, insists on just one of these alternatives - its own policy
package. While conditionality as such is legitimate, it should be confined to making sure that
some policies are adopted that will bring about the probability of repayment, not to a
particular package of policies as Fund conditionality is. The Fund, therefore, goes beyond the
limits of legitimate conditionality, if this is interpreted as a requirement that any lender is
justified in imposing.
Secondly, there is the issue of how Fund conditions are arrived at. The justification for
legitimacy suggested above would lead to the conclusion that the borrower should offer a set
of policies to the Fund, which in turn may discuss/negotiate with the borrower until agreement
is reached. In a sense the borrower would impose its own conditionality, sometimes describedQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 17
as self-conditionality. This type of conditionality would have the considerable advantage, from
the perspective of effectiveness, that self-selected policies are more likely to be adopted,
supported and sustained. It is widely acknowledged that lack of ’ownership’ has been a major
cause of deficiencies in Fund and World Bank programmes. Self-conditionality would solve
the ownership problem. 
However, the reality is very different. Fund officials devise the basic frameworks of the
programmes with little contribution from local officials. Most programmes contain a near
identical set of policies; differences lie in the magnitudes, sequencing and so on, and in these
areas local people may make some contribution. Fund teams do much of their work in
Washington, arriving in a country with much of the programme prepared and stay for two or
three weeks. These are the policy programmes which will determine most elements of
economic policies for several years - levels of government expenditure and taxation, the
exchange rate, price policy etc. Yet local inputs are very small, and Fund knowledge of the
countries typically unimpressive. While the international community advocates democracy and
participation, it turns a blind eye to the fact that the major economic decisions of Fund-
borrowing countries are taken in Washington. As already noted, this mode of reaching
’agreement’ has a price, not only in terms of participation, but also the effectiveness of the
policies. In some cases, policy agreement is followed by violent protests (e.g. in Zambia,
Dominican Republic, Venezuela to mention just a few), which arise because the Fund
technocrats do not understand local political realities. 
We should note that countries which represent potential global threats (economically or
politically) are treated differently - their programmes, e.g. that of Russia or Mexico when in
crisis, are negotiated rapidly and with generous conditions. It is the relatively weak economies
which face the standard treatment.
ii) The content and impact of Fund policy conditions
IMF policy packages are devised in the context of a simplistic rextbook view of the world,
which does not take into account recent advances in theory, such as wqith respect to
asymmetric information and endogenous growth. Control of monetary aggregates (in turn
requiring control over public expenditure and budget deficits) are regarded as essential toQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 18
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control inflation and to improve the balance of trade, supported by exchange rate devaluation
to provide the incentives for switching resources to the tradable sector ; price controls, trade
9
restrictions and financial repression etc. are to be eliminated to permit market forces to bring
about efficient resource allocation. There is a remarkable consistency about Fund policy
packages - all include deflationary policies in the form of cutbacks in monetary aggregates,
credit (especially to the public sector) and public expenditure; most include switching policies
such as  devaluation and price liberalisation; all include some efficiency promoting measures
such as trade liberalisation, interest rate and price liberalisation.   
10
Some changes occurred towards the end of the 1980s in response to criticisms: the most
substantive was the introduction of joint programmes with the World Bank for low-income
countries (the Structural Adjustment Facility - SAF- and the Enhanced Structural Adjustment
Facility -ESAF). These were longer term programmes and the conditions were jointly agreed
with the World Bank. New objectives were also acknowledged:  for example, economic
growth was accepted as an objective in ESAF programmes, initiated in 1987, and in 1990 the
Managing Director (Camdessus) stated that "Our prime objective is growth" . Similarly, after
11
the criticisms of UNICEF and others, Camdessus noted that ’macroeconomic policies can have
strong effects on the distribution of income and on social equity and welfare. A responsible
adjustment program must take these effects into account, particularly as they impinge on the
most vulnerable or disadvantaged groups in society’  From 1988, each IMF county Mission
12
was required to report on the poverty implications of country programmes.  SAF/ESAF
programmes  are required to "identify measures that can help cushion the possible adverse
effects of certain policies on vulnerable groups... in ways consistent with the program’sQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 19
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macroeconomic framework"  (our italics).  Certain safety net measures have been introduced
13
for the poor in some countries - e.g. the Dominican Republic. But a review of safety net
measures introduced in association with adjustment policies shows that they are rather
ineffective, reaching only a small fraction of those in need.   The basic design of the
14
programmes as a whole has been unchanged as it is claimed that the existing policies are in
fact those best suited to promote the interests of the poor.
These [Fund] programs involve, first and foremost, macroeconomic discipline,
beginning with the reductions of fiscal deficits and monetary measures aimed at
achieving price stability and realistic exchange rates...Let me say outright: these
policies serve the poor, and we must do our utmost to implement them if we are to be 
efficient in the fight against poverty.   (our italics)
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The impact of Fund programmes
A priori one would expect the harsh deflation of Fund programmes to lead to lower output
and employment and increased poverty at least in the short run, while inflation might be
expected to be reduced. Cuts in government expenditure could be expected to reduce the
availability of social sector services and economic infrastructure. In the longer run,  the
elimination of imbalances and greater efficiency of resource allocation might be expected to
lead to a resumption of economic growth, offsetting earlier effects on employment and
poverty.  The ’switching’ policies, devaluation in particular, might be expected to improve
income distribution if the poor are heavily involved in tradable production (perhaps, for
example, where labour-intensive manufactures respond to devaluation, or where peasant
production caters for exports)   but to worsen income distribution  where tradables involve
minerals (oil, copper etc.) and where the poor are heavily involved in non-tradable production,
suffering cuts in employment and real wages (as in industry in Latin America). However, theQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 20
improvements would only occur if there were sufficient flexibility in the economy for
significant export expansion, while many of the poor and vulnerable would inevitably be left
out and suffer the hardships of rising food prices etc. because so many of the worst off are not
in the workforce at all, because they are too old, too young or handicapped, while many others
are not working in the export sectors but are scraping a living in the informal sector or in non-
export agriculture. 
On balance, IMF macro-policies can be expected to reduce incomes in the short to medium
term and worsen poverty, the effects being greater the more the deflationary component and
the less the switching component of policies. The weight given to deflation depends largely on
the availability of funding.  Any worsening of the position of the poor arising from macro-
policies is likely to be compounded by meso-policies that form part of the policy-package - in
particular by cuts in government-provided social services, by the introduction of charges for
schools, health services and water, and by the withdrawal or reduction of food subsidies which
are also typical components of the IMF policy package.
While negative effects are likely in the short to medium term, supporters of the policy package
point out that some stabilisation/adjustment is essential in borrowing countries, whether
supported by the Fund or not. Hence an assessment of what the alternative scenario would
look like, which is unavoidably a speculative exercise, is necessary to assess the net effects of
Fund programmes. 
Empirical evidence shows that in the majority of countries adopting Fund programmes in the
1980s and 1990s, per capita incomes have been falling, and poverty worsening. The 1980s
was a decade in which most African and Latin American countries were forced to borrow
from the IMF. In both these regions average per capita incomes fell and poverty worsened
significantly.  However, as countries which went to the Fund did so because they were in
acute economic difficulties, due to the debt crisis and falling commodity prices, some
adjustment would have been necessary whether they received Fund support or not. Empirical
evidence on the difference Fund programmes made is somewhat inconclusive: partly because
of the difficulty of identifying an agreed ’counterfactual’; and partly because many countries
which had Fund programmes also had World Bank programmes. QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 21
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adjustment hurt the poor?’,  World Development, 24.
Most investigations have been concerned with the effects on macro-variables and not directly
with poverty. The most reliable studies are those that try and incorporate the effects of other
variables (e.g. terms of trade changes) as well as of Fund programmes and then compare
countries with and without Fund programmes. One study for the period 1974-81 showed that
the Fund programmes had no impact on balance of payments, growth or inflation.  A study of
16
1973-1988 showed positive effects on the balance of payments and inflation but negative
effects on growth.  Numerous other studies using a variety of less reliable methodologies
17
come to mixed results. Perhaps the most remarkable finding is  the large number that show no
impact of Fund programmes on the main macro variables.   The conclusion is a that there has
18
been a small negative impact on growth of Fund programmes and little effect on other macro-
variables.
The negative effect on growth can be expected to worsen poverty. For Latin America,
comparisons between countries with and without Fund programmes showed that in the Fund-
assisted countries the wage share fell, suggesting this was compounded by worsening income
distribution. Elsewhere, systematic testing has not been undertaken because of inadequate
data. In Africa, poverty has worsened in Fund-assisted countries, as well as in those countries
without programmes mainly because of the poor growth performance. This does not seem to
have been offset by any positive effects on income distribution, as is sometimes claimed.  
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While some of the poor benefited by improved prices for their export crops only a minority
were involved in export production and  many more were negatively affected by a combination
of rising food prices, falling employment and worsening government services. In Asian
countries, growth performance was positive among adjusting countries (though less than
among other Asian countries) and this offset some tendency for worsening income
distribution, so that poverty generally fell in adjusting countries.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 22
To summarise: Given the most rosy interpretation, Fund programmes have done nothing for
average incomes, or the poor, at a time when the position of people in general and the poor in
particular was under threat from the worsening economic situation. Moreover, they have often
not even achieved their stabilisation objectives. 
Financing of programmes
The record of net flows from the Fund to developing countries is not impressive. In 1982, at
the peak of the debt crisis, the net credit from the Fund to developing countries was $6.9b.
Non-oil developing countries’ deficit on current account of the balance of payments was $82b.
in that year. Net credit rose to $11b. in 1983 (or nearly a fifth of the current account deficit,
which had been squeezed due to lack of finance). But this was the peak flow. Net credit fell to
$0.3b. in 1985 and from 1986 to 1990 inclusive was negative, the total outflow over these
years from developing countries to the Fund being $15.5b., thus making a negative
contribution to countries’ efforts"’to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments
without resorting to measures destructive of national or international prosperity" (Articles of
Agreement of the Fund, 1(v)). The net flow has continued to be negative for most years in the
1990s apart from the big loans involved in the Mexico rescue of 1994/5.
Moreover, Fund lending has tightened the debt situation of borrowing countries, by replacing
trade and commercial debts - payments on which countries in difficulties may and do postpone
- by its own loans which countries have to give the highest priority if they are to be able to
borrow from the World Bank or the Paris Club.
The IMF is essentially a revolving fund whose loans have to be paid back after a short time, so
its not surprising that its contribution in aggregate is near to zero. The Fund was initially
designed for developed countries, which have a flexibility that makes it possible for them to
turn round a deficit quickly. Moreover, the SDRs (and in Keynes’ initial idea the bancor)
would have permitted more and longer-term financing. Developing countries, especially poor
primary producing developing countries, need more and longer term finance, so as to enable
them to undertake new investments, promote education etc., all essential for adjustment.
Hence the short term finance of the Fund is essentially unsuited to their problems. Moreover,QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 23
along with the short-term funds come policies which require a short-term response, which,
therefore, as noted above, are much too deflationary, with adverse consequences for growth,
employment and poverty. 
When Fund programmes are combined with World Bank programmes (as in ESAF) this
problem is less acute, since more long-term finance is forthcoming. It remains true that these
programmes too are essentially underfunded, and the policy package requested still has too
large a deflationary component.
The funding needs of developing countries arise largely from the two problems of huge debt
service bills and worsening commodity prices. If the Fund, in its role of global monetary
institution, had produced a solution for these problems, then its own inadequate financing
would have mattered much less. But it failed to do this so that its financing role was
important, and here too it failed the countries most in need - in Africa and Latin America. 
Conclusion
This note has reviewed the two major roles of the Fund - as global monetary institution; and as
lender and policy-maker for individual developing countries. It has argued that the Fund has
failed to make a significant contribution as a global monetary institution. It has not initiated
solutions to major problems as they arose, ranging from recycling of oil-surpluses, to the debt
and commodity price problems, to the volatility of private international capital flows that we
have witnessed in the 1990s.  In its fifty year history, the Fund has not performed the two
major roles required of a global monetary institution - that of lender-of-the-last-resort or
prudential regulator of international capital.  These failures have increased the need for
individual country finance; but as a revolving short-term financing institution, the Fund’s
finance has been negligible when most needed, dictating harsh policy advice. This financial
constraint could have been relaxed by greater use of SDRs (or sale of the gold stocks). But the
countries that govern the Fund rejected this option. The Managing Director has put forward
some imaginative proposals in this regard which have been turned down by the developed
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The declared objectives of the Fund today include the promotion of growth and an
improvement in  the position of the poor. The earlier analysis indicates that to achieve this 
serious revision of Fund policies and lending are needed. The following are some suggestions:
1. A key factor is to reduce the deflationary element in programmes. This would not only
mean less immediate costs for borrowers, but would also make it more likely that successful
switching occurs, since investment is often essential to permit the necessary expansion of
exports (or import-substitutes) and this will not be forthcoming if there are severe credit
restraints and cuts in complementary public infrastructure expenditure.
2. To achieve a smaller deflationary element would usually require more net financing. This
might consist of (i) more flows of finance from the Fund itself, aid donors or the private
sector; (ii) reduced outflows on existing borrowing, through debt write-offs, debt rescheduling
on generous terms, and/or reduced interest rates.
Any success in improving prices of exports, by schemes to sustain commodity prices, for
example, would also reduce the need for finance.
3. Less emphasis should be placed on cutting public expenditure and more on raising revenue
except in very heavily taxed countries. Government expenditure in infrastructure is necessary
to help promote private investment; social sector expenditure is essential not only for its
contribution to human wellbeing, but because education is one of the most important inputs
into economic growth.
4. The introduction of user charges for health and education (apart from complex hospital
procedures and tertiary education) should be avoided. These charges invariably hit the poor
and deter users. Exemption schemes do not work adequately.
5. In most situations food subsidies should be maintained, although the incidence should be
examined and ’poor people’s foods’ subsidised. Even if they do not reach all the poor, and if
better off people get access to them, food subsidies  almost always have a significant positive
effect on the nutrition of the poor. When other policies are being introduced that are liable toQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 25
hurt the poor, consideration should be given to introducing food subsidies.
6. Government expenditure reviews should ensure that priority expenditures (primary health
and education, much economic infrastructure) are not cut in any general expenditure cuts.
7.  ’Safety nets’ during stabilisation should be reconsidered. Current programmes often  consist
mainly of projects for civil servants who have lost their jobs. They do not reach most of the
poor. Employment schemes which are open-ended and offer employment at very low wages to
anyone who comes forward are much more effective, as experience in Chile and Maharashtra
has shown.  These should be supplemented by schemes to provide credit and technology for
the low-income.   
8. Targets of Fund programmes should include growth of per capita incomes and poverty
reduction (reflecting the new objectives) and these elements should be monitored as carefully
as money supply, inflation rates etc. are currently monitored.  
9. In general, the fund should be less dogmatic and ideological on how the objectives of
stabilisation, growth and poverty reduction are to be achieved. They should be ready to
comment on alternative programmes that countries put forward and to recognise that there are
alternative routes to the same end, particularly in the light of the dubious record of their own
programmes in achieving these objectives.  
Finally, there is also some current debate as to the governance of the IMF itself on two distinct
yet related issues. On the one hand, there is concern that the directors are insufficiently senior
to take major decisions, so finance ministers must be convened to take them  - with a loss of
the speed and discretion which are essential for effective central banking (BWC, 1994). A
more regulatory stance might reduce the need for such delegates, but an enhanced
international role (even as executive secretariat to some international body) would once again
require directors with authority both among their peers and with their home government. On
the other hand, there is a longstanding criticism that the IMF board reflects the industrial-
country ’shareholders’: even taking into account the non-industrial countries’ share in world
output their representation should be greater, but this should not be obtained at the cost ofQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 26
       See F.Stewart and S.Daws, ’The case for an Economic and Social Security Council at the United
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Nations’, Viewpoint 10, Jan. 1996.
reducing the Fund’s potential power to regulate the G7 policies. Once again, a more regulatory
(rather than interventionist) approach would reduce the fears of all parties and make a
balanced solution more likely. This might take the form an ’economic security’ body similar to
the UN Security Council with permanent G7 membership and rotating minority membership
from the Rest of the World.
20
The world urgently needs a global institution which will oversee the world economy;
coordinate reflationary or deflationary action; consider and recommend action on major global
issues such as debt, capital movements, commodities, etc. The IMF has failed to do this.
Either it should be asked to perform these functions or a new global institution should be
developed to do so, such as an Economic and Social Security Council at the United Nations. QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 27
Appendix
Costing reforms proposed concerning the operations of the International Monetary
Fund
In our evidence to the Treasury Committee on the International Monetary Fund of November
4th 1996 we agreed to supply the Committee with a note estimating the cost of the proposals
we had made concerning the IMF in the conclusion of our written evidence. This note
provides such an estimate.
The one proposal that would require additional foreign finance is the proposal that the
deflationary element in Fund programmes should be reduced. 
Costs of avoiding deflationary programmes
A major reason why IMF programmes tend to be deflationary is a shortage of foreign finance.
This shortage concerns net availability of foreign finance. Net foreign finance is the balance
of gross inflows of aid and private finance less outflows for interest payments and
amortisation. Hence additional net finance can be achieved in a variety of ways, i.e.
(i)increasing gross inflows of aid or private finance; (ii)reduced interest rates on existing debt;
(iii)delayed (or cancelled) payments on debt.
Given current export earnings, the availability of net foreign finance determines the level of
imports a country can afford. Imports may consist of (a) imports for consumption; (b)imports
which form current inputs into domestic production - e.g. parts, fertiliser, etc.; and
(c)investment goods. The trade liberalisation programmes of the IMF typically raise imports
for consumption. Given this, the productive imports, (b) and (c) tend to be squeezed when
there is a shortage of finance. But squeezing  (b) leads to a fall in current production, while
reducing (c) means that future growth is adversely affected, while the economy’s ability to
reorient itself towards new types of import substitutes and exports is constrained by lack of
investment. 
Adjustment with growth and poverty reduction requires a rise in imports for inputs andQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 28
investment, which means a rise in net foreign finance sufficient for this and to finance any rise
in imports of consumption goods associated with the liberalisation. 
In the 1980s, there was insufficient net finance in both Latin America and Africa, but Asia
managed well because of its rapid export growth and inflows of foreign private capital. The
Latin American situation has been turned round as a result of the Brady Plan, which released
resources previously devoted to debt servicing, and the large inflow of private foreign capital
that followed. As a result growth and poverty reduction  resumed in Latin America in the
1990s. It is Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) that is suffering today from a shortage of net finance.
This is a major reason why adjustment has not been combined with growth and poverty
reduction in many countries in Africa. The ’success’ cases, including Ghana and Uganda, have
been generously financed, and both started their adjustment with relatively small debt
servicing. Underlying the shortage of net finance in SSA is the continuing poor terms of trade,
so that despite increases in export volumes, real earnings have not kept pace. Therefore,the
main need is for additional financing to permit a sufficient level and growth of imports in SSA.
SSA’s foreign exchange problems began around 1980 when the terms of trade began to move
adversely, and an import squeeze was initiated.
As can be seen from table 1, total imports fell by 2.4% p.a. from 1980-94 (falling in the 1980s
and with some recovery in the 1990s.) Imports per capita fell by 5.3% p.a. These figures relate
to imports valued at current price dollars. In volume terms, they did even worse (by about 1%
p.a.). QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 29
  Data derived from the World Bank, World Debt Tables 1994-5.
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Table 1
SubSaharan Africa: Imports, growth and investment, 1980-1994
1980-90 1990-94 1980-94
Imports, $m. value, - 3.7 + 1.8 - 2.4
% p.a.
Imports $m.p. cap., - 6.7 - 0.9 - 5.3
% p.a.
GDP + 1.7 + 0.7 + 1.5
GDP p.capita - 1.3 - 1.8 - 1.4
Investment,  - 4.1 - 0.4 - 3.1
Exports, $m.% p.a. + 1.1 + 0.9 + 1.0
 
Source: World Bank, World Development Report 1996
The import squeeze was a major element holding back economic growth. Despite the fall in
imports GDP managed to grow by a small amount, but much less than the growth in
population, and per capita GDP fell, as did investment. 
For positive growth in per capita incomes, import volumes need to grow by a minimum of 4%
p.a. (i.e. by at least one percentage point more than the growth in population). Given the slow
growth in export earnings, this requires additional financing of 3% of the current value of
imports, or, in 1993 values, by $2.8 billion for SSA as a whole. This is equivalent to one fifth
of present grants (aid) to SSA or between one quarter and one fifth of total debt servicing in
1993.  
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The IMF is not the place to look for this additional financing because it requires rapid
repayment. For this reason its record in transferring resources to SSA has been extremely poor
in recent years, with negative net flows from 1988 to 1993, and positive flows of only $0.5b.
and $0.6b. in 1994 and 1995. The finance needs to come from some combination of debtQEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 30
write-off and additional grant aid. 
$2.8b. represents only 3.7% of all DAC aid (1994), and could be achieved by drastically
reducing aid to middle and high income developing countries. If instead it were to be realised
by an increase in aid proportionately from all DAC countries, the British contribution would
be $118m.
SSA’s fundamental foreign exchange problems arise from worsening commodity prices and a
failure to diversify into potentially fast growing manufactured exports. The commodity price
question has proved difficult to tackle, but renewed international attention to it is warranted.
Diversification into manufactured exports could only be achieved if SSA has the resources to
spend on education, training and physical investment. Hence it does not represent an
alternative to more generous current financing, but rather more current financing is essential
for it.  Ten years of more generous finance for SSA, focused on developing human capital and
diversifying the economy, could lead to a situation in which export earnings and private
finance are sufficient to generate an adequate growth in imports. 
The other proposals in the evidence to the Committee
The other proposals all involve redirection of domestic resources:
- The proposal that governments of adjusting developing countries should place more
emphasis on revenue raising and less on expenditure reduction, except in very heavily taxed
countries, would raise revenue, releasing resources for other uses. 
- The proposal that user charges for health and education should be avoided, apart from those
for complex health procedures and tertiary education, would cost governments little since at
present user charges generally raise only a small fraction of revenue (a maximum of 3% of
total government revenue and typically below 1/2%). This could be recovered by the
introduction of charges on complex health procedures and tertiary education.
- The proposal that food subsidies on ’poor people’s foods’ should be maintained (or
introduced) could be financed by a small increase in indirect taxation on luxury commodities
(including petroleum). Subsidies on foods consumed mainly by upper income groups (e.g.
meat) should be withdrawn.QEH Working Paper Series - QEHWPS03 Page 31
- The proposal that priority expenditures which benefit the poor should be protected in any
expenditure cuts could be financed by larger cuts of low priority expenditures, such as defence
expenditure. Priority expenditures directed towards the poor rarely exceed 10% of
government expenditure, and is usually significantly less than defence expenditure’s share.
With total expenditure cuts of 5%, protection of priority items against such cuts would involve
at most 1/2% of government expenditure. This could be financed by a double cut in defence
expenditure (i.e. by 10% instead of 5%).
- The proposal to redesign safety nets so as to replace the Social Funds by open-ended
employment schemes at low-wages in part involves a switching of the existing expenditures
currently devoted to Social Funds. It may involve some additional expenditures which could
be financed by extra taxes or charges on those who benefit from the results of the employment
(as in the case of the Maharashtra Employment Scheme) and other revenue-raising measures
(e.g. local taxation). Additional foreign resources are not needed. The most successful
schemes, including the extensive schemes in Chile in the early 1980s and the Maharashtra
Employment Scheme were domestically financed. 
- The last two proposals concern monitoring and ideology and have no resource implications.